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A B S T R A C T
With the aim to better understand the nature of complex problem solving (CPS), we investigated the link
between conﬁdence judgments, which represent a major constituent of metacognitive self-monitoring, and CPS
by regressing the two facets of CPS (i.e., knowledge acquisition and knowledge application) on conﬁdence in
CPS. To ensure that the link between conﬁdence in CPS and CPS is distinct, we controlled for reasoning, which is
the strongest known correlate of CPS. Using structural equation modeling in a sample of 471 German seventh-
grade students, we found that conﬁdence in CPS explained 67% of the variance in CPS knowledge acquisition
and 55% of the variance in CPS knowledge application. These links were reduced but remained substantial when
we controlled for reasoning. The results indicate that conﬁdence judgments as indicators of metacognitive
monitoring in CPS are substantially linked to successful CPS, thus bringing us one step closer to a full
understanding of CPS.
1. Introduction
Complex problem solving (CPS) describes the process of successfully
interacting with nonroutinely encountered and dynamically changing
environments (Buchner, 1995). As such, CPS is needed in a variety of
situations that virtually all students face in their everyday lives. For
instance, CPS is required when students use new technological devices
(smartphones, computer programs, etc.; Wüstenberg, Greiﬀ, & Funke,
2012) and is needed to cope with everyday life in professional, private,
and educational settings. Its relevance has been recognized in educa-
tional research (Greiﬀ et al., 2013), and a large body of research has
recently emerged to try to understand the nature of CPS by focusing on
the relation between CPS and concurrent cognitive skills (Kröner,
Plass, & Leutner, 2005). One overarching ﬁnding is that CPS overlaps
substantially with reasoning. However, reasoning does not account for
all of the variance in CPS (e.g., see the meta-analysis by Stadler, Becker,
Gödker, Leutner, & Greiﬀ, 2015). This coincides with CPS theory, which
proposes that constructs other than reasoning play important roles in
CPS. In particular, self-regulation, the skill that is used to monitor and
adapt one's problem-solving strategies, should be a central component
of CPS (Funke, 2003; Ifenthaler, 2012; Mayer, 1998; Wüstenberg,
Stadler, Hautamäki, & Greiﬀ, 2014). In CPS, it is likely that students
do not apply expedient systematic approaches for investigating dy-
namic problem characteristics from the very beginning. Thus, they need
to realize that they have to continuously adapt their problem-solving
behavior to be successful in CPS.
Among the core aspects of self-regulation is metacognitive self-
monitoring, that is, the observing and judging of one's own performance
(Fritzsche, Kröner, Dresel, Kopp, &Martschinke, 2012; Stankov, 2000;
Stankov, Lee, Luo, & Hogan, 2012). Both performance judgments and
self-reported conﬁdence have been shown to be both economic and
valid indicators of metacognitive self-monitoring (Fritzsche, et al.,
2012; Händel, & Fritzsche, 2016; Stankov, 2000).
In the present study, we investigated whether and to what extent
metacognitive monitoring in complex problem solving is linked to
overall performance in CPS. Moreover, we aimed to take the ﬁrst steps
toward ensuring that such a link cannot be ascribed to reasoning, which
is at the core of intelligence (Carroll, 2003) and is a strong and well-
known correlate of CPS (see the meta-analysis by Stadler et al., 2015).
1.1. Conﬁdence in CPS and CPS
In more detail, CPS reﬂects the skill needed to understand and to
subsequently control dynamic environments that require the problem
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solver to actively interact with this environment (Buchner, 1995) in a
situation in which not all the information that is needed to control the
environment is apparent from the beginning and has to be discovered
through active interaction (Funke, 2001). CPS research focuses on two
central and intertwined facets of CPS: knowledge acquisition and
knowledge application (e.g., Greiﬀ, Kretzschmar, Müller,
Spinath, &Martin, 2014; Greiﬀ et al., 2013; Kröner et al., 2005).
Successful knowledge acquisition is a skill that enables people to
explore and understand the functioning of a complex system, whereas
knowledge application is needed to be able to use one's understanding
of the environment to control it. To give an example, if students have to
edit pictures with an unfamiliar picture editor, they need to explore and
understand the functions of the editor (knowledge acquisition) and
subsequently use the acquired knowledge to control the editor (knowl-
edge application).
Research that is aimed at understanding CPS has had a strong focus
on the relations between CPS and other cognitive ability measures with
a particular focus on reasoning because reasoning is a central compo-
nent of intelligence (Carroll, 2003). One often-reported ﬁnding is that
CPS overlaps substantially with cognitive ability measures, in particular
with reasoning (Kröner, et al., 2005), whereas there is also some
evidence for the unique explanatory value of CPS regarding external
outcomes such as academic achievement (e.g., Greiﬀ et al., 2013;
Wüstenberg et al., 2012; cf. Kretzschmar, Neubert,
Wüstenberg, & Greiﬀ, 2016). However, numerous scholars have noted
that other constructs may also be important for CPS, including
noncognitive aspects. For instance, CPS is supposed to be highly
relevant for metacognition (e.g., Funke, 2003; Ifenthaler, 2012;
Huber, 1995; Mayer, 1998), which is the “cognition that reﬂects on,
monitors, or regulates ﬁrst order cognition” (Kuhn, 2000, p. 178; see
also Flavell, 1979; Kleitman, & Gibson, 2011; Schraw,
Crippen, & Hartley, 2006). Conceptually, metacognition is intertwined
with skill in revising and evaluating tasks, goals, and strategies (Flavell,
1979). As problem solving requires such metacognitive skills to apply
or adapt problem-solving strategies whenever necessary (Ifenthaler,
2012), it is conceptually linked to metacognition. Moreover, complex
problems may particularly require metacognitive self-monitoring skills
(Vollmeyer & Rheinberg, 1999) because students might be over-
whelmed by the quantity of information that has to be tackled
(Zimmermann & Campillo, 2003).
As metacognition requires skill in evaluating and adapting the
process of problem solving, one aspect that is at the core of metacogni-
tion is one's judgment of one's own performance (Stankov, 2000).
Throughout a large part of the literature, conﬁdence is deﬁned as “a
state of being certain about the success of a particular behavioral act”
(Stankov et al., 2012, p. 1). That is, it may be considered a combination
of (a) a performance judgment and (b) certainty about this judgment.
To disentangle these two aspects, in the present paper, we focused on
the ﬁrst aspect of conﬁdence. For instance, during each CPS task we
assessed the students' conﬁdence by asking them whether they thought
they were solving it correctly. This aspect of conﬁdence should be a
central aspect of CPS because CPS constantly requires accurate perfor-
mance judgments (Funke, 2003; Greiﬀ& Fischer, 2013; Huber, 1995),
and eﬀective problem solvers should evaluate their performance during
problem solving to decide whether they should continue following the
strategy they chose or whether an adaptation is needed (Funke, 2003;
Mayer, 1998). Thus, the correct estimation of their performance should
foster successful CPS.
At the same time, conﬁdence may be inﬂuenced by students' CPS
performance. For example, if students are aware that they are usually
successful in problem solving, they may be more likely to provide
positive performance judgments during problem solving tasks. This is
particularly pertinent to CPS (as opposed to static problem solving)
because CPS tasks oﬀer a large number of task-inherent cues due to
their dynamic and interactive character: Students may be aware that
they are on the right track on the basis of task-inherent cues
(Kröner & Biermann, 2007). For instance, if the complex problem was
to attach a blue frame to a picture with an unfamiliar picture editor and
students have ﬁgured out how to attach a red frame, they might be
aware that they are on the right track. Moreover, complex tasks enable
students to verify their acquired knowledge. For instance, if students
wish to verify that they know how to attach a blue frame, they can
attach the frame to another picture.
Taken together, theory suggests a strong mutual link between CPS
and conﬁdence in CPS, and this should translate into a unique statistical
eﬀect when trying to explain variance in CPS performance with
conﬁdence in CPS. Whereas such a link between conﬁdence and CPS
has not been investigated empirically, conﬁdence in cognitive tests has
been shown to be substantially associated with other skills such as
reasoning and perception (Kröner & Biermann, 2007) as well as writing,
speaking, and numeracy (Stankov & Lee, 2008). Further, Kleitman and
Gibson (2011) and Kleitman and Moscrop (2010) reported that test-
speciﬁc conﬁdence is linked to students' grades in mathematics,
spelling, and reading, making it seem likely that conﬁdence in CPS is
linked to CPS performance. Altogether, we hypothesized that conﬁ-
dence in CPS would explain variance in the CPS facets knowledge
acquisition and knowledge application as well as in CPS variance that is
shared by the two facets (Hypothesis 1).
1.2. Reasoning, conﬁdence in CPS, and CPS
In a second step, we aimed to put any gain in knowledge about the
link between conﬁdence and CPS performance (Hypothesis 1) together
with the most established correlate of CPS: reasoning. As indicated
above, researchers who have previously attempted to understand the
nature of CPS have come to the conclusion that reasoning is a crucial
constituent of CPS (see the meta-analysis by Stadler et al., 2015)
because both reasoning and CPS require the abilities to identify relevant
information (Babcock, 2002; Funke, 2001) and to elaborate and apply
strategies to solve problems (Wüstenberg et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, reasoning and CPS diﬀer conceptually with regard to
additional requirements because all information that is needed to solve
the problem is given at the outset for reasoning tasks but not for CPS
tasks (Greiﬀ et al., 2014; Wüstenberg et al., 2012; cf. Kretzschmar et al.,
2016; Wittmann & Süß, 1999). Complex problems actively generate the
particular situations that provide the relevant information needed to
solve the problems. Thus, CPS demands an active and systematic search
for missing information and the skill needed to control dynamic
environments that change with time or as the problem solver interacts
with them (Wüstenberg et al., 2012).
Empirically, the investigation into whether reasoning and CPS diﬀer
is often conducted by regressing the CPS facets of knowledge acquisi-
tion and knowledge application on reasoning (e.g., Greiﬀ et al., 2014;
Greiﬀ et al., 2013; Kröner et al., 2005; Wüstenberg et al., 2012). The
overall ﬁndings of such studies were that reasoning could not account
for all of the variance in knowledge acquisition and knowledge
application and that the two facets remained correlated when reasoning
was controlled for. This indicates that the facets share CPS-speciﬁc
variance that goes beyond reasoning. As Kröner (2014) stated, this
variance might be partially explained by self-evaluation as a core aspect
of self-regulation, which can be operationalized via CPS performance
judgments. Thus, we hypothesized that conﬁdence in CPS and CPS
would be linked beyond reasoning. In particular, we expected that
including conﬁdence in CPS would explain variance in the CPS facets
knowledge acquisition and knowledge application as well as CPS
variance that is shared by the two facets beyond reasoning
(Hypothesis 2).
1.3. Hypotheses
With the present research, we aimed to explore the nature of CPS by
investigating its link to metacognitive conﬁdence judgments in CPS. To
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take the ﬁrst steps toward ensuring that conﬁdence in CPS would be
found to be a distinct correlate of CPS beyond related constructs, we
aimed to conﬁrm that conﬁdence in CPS is linked to CPS beyond
reasoning, which has been shown to be a strong—if not the stron-
gest—correlate of CPS (Greiﬀ et al., 2014; Greiﬀ et al., 2013; Kröner
et al., 2005; Wüstenberg et al., 2012).2
We aimed to accomplish this goal by subsequently testing two
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Conﬁdence in CPS will be linked to CPS (i.e., knowledge
acquisition and knowledge application as well as CPS variance that is
shared by the two facets).
Hypothesis 2. Conﬁdence in CPS will be linked to CPS when reasoning
is controlled for (i.e., knowledge acquisition and knowledge application
as well as CPS variance that is shared by the two facets).
2. Method
2.1. Participants and procedure3
The sample consisted of 505 seventh-grade students (Mage = 13.16,
SDage = 0.50, 48.9% female; 8.4% did not report gender) in the federal
German states of Saarland and Rhineland-Palatinate. However, we
excluded 38 outliers after computing regressions (e.g., the fourth
knowledge acquisition item was regressed on the second and third
knowledge acquisition items). If the resulting standardized residuals
exceeded two standard deviations, we excluded the outliers, as
suggested by Field (2013).4 The schools participated voluntarily. The
students were enrolled in 21 classes at seven diﬀerent secondary
schools. In Germany, students can acquire one of three diﬀerent school
diplomas: a general diploma, an intermediate diploma, or the highest
diploma that enables university admission. The present sample con-
sisted of 13 classes in schools that oﬀered only the highest school
diploma (Gymnasium), ﬁve classes in schools that oﬀered both the
general and the intermediate school diplomas (Realschule Plus), and two
classes in schools where any of the three diplomas could be acquired
(Gesamtschule). Students were tested in a group setting in their own
classes, supervised by two external, trained test administrators. The test
battery was comprised of, among others, a paper-and-pencil assessment
of ﬂuid reasoning, a CPS test, and measures of conﬁdence in CPS.
2.2. Missing data
The percentage of missing values in the variables ranged from 2.9%
to 21.5%. More precisely, the percentage of missing data for the
reasoning indicators was 2.9%, 2.9%, 3.1%, and 3.5% in the ﬁrst test
half and 3.1%, 2.9%, 3.1%, and 4.2% in the second test half. The
missing rate for knowledge acquisition was 4.0%, 4.4%, 4.4%, and
5.6%. The missing rate for knowledge application was 4.0%, 4.2%,
4.4%, and 5.6%. The missing rate for conﬁdence in knowledge
acquisition was 14.2%, 14.2% 14.4%, and 18.0%, and it was 18.8%
18.0%, 18.0%, and 21.5% for conﬁdence in knowledge application.
Missing data were mainly the result of technical problems, exclusion of
the questionnaire due to time restrictions, and a very small proportion
of students who did not attend school because of sickness or doctors'
appointments. Naturally, data were missing at the highest rates for the
conﬁdence ratings, as these were included in the CPS assessment, which
sometimes faced technical problems. Thus, students with missing data
on the CPS items were likely to have missing data on the respective
conﬁdence ratings. Thus, the missing values should be missing at
random, which was also indicated by Little's (1988) test, which showed
that the missing values did not occur completely at random
(χ2 = 2114.439, df= 1927, p= .002).
To impute the missing data, we used multiple imputation that was
based on a variance-covariance model (Asparouhov &Muthén, 2010).
To impute the missing values of all variables included in the analysis,
we used Mplus version 7.11 (Muthén &Muthén, 1998–2014) to gen-
erate ﬁve complete data sets.5
2.3. Measures
2.3.1. CPS (knowledge acquisition and knowledge application)
CPS was assessed with the computer-based MicroDYN approach,
which was implemented and conducted with the CBA Item-Builder
(Rölke, 2012). Each of the eight MicroDYN items consisted of varying
numbers of inputs (e.g., diﬀerent training methods to train a handball
team displayed as Trainings A, B, and C in Fig. 1) and outputs (e.g.,
motivation, power of throw, and exhaustion in handball). The input
variables could be manipulated by moving the slide controls to the left
or right and by clicking “apply.”When the slide controls were moved to
the right, the inputs (e.g., Training A) increased. If an output (e.g.,
motivation) was inﬂuenced by the input, it increased too. An increase in
the output could be seen in an increase in the black graph as it moved
upwards and the corresponding increase in the number underneath the
output label. An input could be linked to zero, one, or multiple outputs.
First, in the knowledge acquisition phase, the students were asked to
explore the task-speciﬁc system characteristics (i.e., the relations
between inputs and outputs) by changing the slide controls manually.
In the example displayed in Fig. 1, the students had to explore which of
the training methods had an inﬂuence on the output variables
“Motivation”, “Power of throw”, and “Exhaustion”. The knowledge
about the inﬂuences of the inputs that was gained via exploration and
was assessed by the task of drawing a graphic model was displayed at
the bottom of the screen (Fig. 1; the blue arrows in the model depict an
inﬂuence of Training A on “Motivation”, an inﬂuence of Trainings B
and C on “Power of throw”, and an inﬂuence of Training C on
“Exhaustion”). When students ﬁnished drawing the graphic model,
they had to press the button labeled “done” and could then move on to
the next phase, the knowledge application phase.
In the knowledge application phase, the students were asked to
reach a predeﬁned goal state (i.e., the state of the outputs) that was
marked with red lines in the outputs and with numbers to the right of
the outputs (Fig. 1). To ensure that the students did not use the
knowledge application phase to explore the relations between the
inputs and outputs (which was what they were supposed to do in the
knowledge acquisition phase and which had already been scored with
the graphic model), they could click on the “apply” button only a
maximum of four times (knowledge application phase; Greiﬀ, 2012). As
knowledge acquisition and knowledge application are considered to be
two psychometrically separable facets of CPS (Funke, 2001), the
students were shown the correct underlying system structure during
2 A priori, we also aimed to investigate problem solving self-concept (PSSC) in the nexus
of CPS, conﬁdence in CPS, and reasoning using the German adaption (Schwanzer,
Trautwein, Lüdtke, & Sydow, 2005) of the Self-Description Questionnaire for young adults
(SDQ III; Marsh, 1992). However, due to reliability issues, we decided to exclude PSSC
from the analyses in the present manuscript.
3 Please note that the data we are reporting here are part of a larger collection of data
and have been used in other manuscripts, too. For instance, Krkovic, Wüstenberg, and
Greiﬀ (2016) investigated the structure of collaborative problem solving and CPS.
4 This did not change the results notably but led to better scale reliability.
5 The variables used in the imputation were selected on the basis of theoretical
considerations (i.e., we chose the variables that were potentially conceptually linked to
the imputed variables) and were comprised of mean scores of cognitive measures and
noncognitive measures. However, after including all variables, the imputation model had
been too comprehensive to reach convergence. Thus, some variables had to be excluded.
The following variables and scales (means) were used in the ﬁnal imputation model
(besides the items from the analyses): grade in mathematics, grade point average, time on
task in knowledge acquisition, time on task in knowledge application, need for cognition,
all Big Five personality factors, academic self-concept, self-concept of intellect, self-
concept in honesty, ICT usage, ICT skills, motivation to work on a computer, numerical
reasoning, spatial thinking, eﬀort in working on the CPS tasks, and all PSSC items.
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the knowledge application phase, even if they did not arrive at the
correct solution during knowledge acquisition (Greiﬀ, 2012). In this
way, the students who solved the knowledge acquisition task incor-
rectly were given the chance to solve the respective knowledge
application phase correctly.
For each task, the two phases (i.e., knowledge acquisition and
knowledge application) were scored dichotomously. In the knowledge
acquisition phase, credit was given for a correctly drawn model,
whereas in the knowledge application phase, credit was given if the
goal state was reached. As we were interested in the extent to which
conﬁdence and reasoning provide explanatory value for shared and
unique variance in the CPS facets, we modeled CPS as two separate but
correlated factors to represent each facet (knowledge acquisition and
knowledge application).
For our study, the instructional phase for MicroDYN, which
consisted of three consecutive instructional videos, was supplemented
by an additional video that explained the conﬁdence assessment.
However, a pilot study with N= 93 students showed that the students
were overwhelmed by these expanded instructions. This became
apparent when the students seemed to be surprised when the pop-up
windows for assessing their conﬁdence appeared. Thus, we decided to
provide instructions for only the CPS test ﬁrst and excluded the
conﬁdence assessment from the ﬁrst four items. After administering
four MicroDYN items, we gave the instructions for the conﬁdence
assessment. In the subsequent four MicroDYN tasks, we assessed
students' task-related conﬁdence in addition to their CPS achievement.
Thus, we administered a total of 16 indicators for CPS achievement (8
for knowledge acquisition and 8 for knowledge application) and 8
indicators for conﬁdence in CPS (4 for knowledge acquisition and 4 for
knowledge application). However, we used only the items that also
included the conﬁdence assessments as indicators of students' CPS as
our goal was to compare students' achievement directly with their task-
related conﬁdence, and we had no measure of students' conﬁdence in
their answers to the ﬁrst four items.
2.3.2. Conﬁdence in CPS (knowledge acquisition and knowledge
application)
After the ﬁrst four MicroDYN items were completed, the students
watched a video that explained the additional conﬁdence assessment
that was included in the remaining four MicroDYN items. Conﬁdence in
CPS was assessed once in each knowledge acquisition phase and once in
each knowledge application phase. Conﬁdence in knowledge acquisi-
tion was assessed at the end of the knowledge acquisition phase when
the students had drawn the model representing the system structures.
They were asked if they believed that they had drawn the graphical
model correctly or not, which resulted in binary variables. In the
subsequent knowledge application phase, we could not assess their
conﬁdence after the task (as was done in the knowledge acquisition
phase) because the students were able to actually see whether they had
reached the goal state or not. Thus, the conﬁdence scores were collected
after the ﬁrst step toward the goal state (i.e., after they clicked on the
“apply” button for the ﬁrst time in the knowledge acquisition phase).
The students were able to see the consequences of their ﬁrst step toward
the goal state. Then, the students were asked whether or not they
believed they were on the right track toward reaching the goal state.
Thus, the conﬁdence assessment resulted in a total of four items for
conﬁdence in CPS in the knowledge acquisition phase and four items
for conﬁdence in CPS in the knowledge application phase.6
2.3.3. Reasoning
Fluid reasoning was assessed with the German version of the Culture
Fig. 1. A translated example of a MicroDYN item (the original item was presented in German) during the knowledge application phase. The red horizontal lines indicate the goal states
that need to be reached by manipulating the input variables. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
6 Note that the students were subsequently asked how sure they were about their
performance judgment (e.g., “I think I drew the model correctly/incorrectly” followed by
“I am very uncertain/…/very certain about this answer”). However, this paper focused on
performance judgments. The inclusion of the certainty measure would not have let to
diﬀerent results or conclusions. However, it would have been accompanied by a series of
problems (e.g., Is a student who is “very uncertain” that he/she solved a problem
“correctly” more conﬁdent than a student who is “very uncertain” that he/she solved a
problem “incorrectly”?). To ensure the use of sound data, we used only the dichotomous
performance judgment score.
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Fair Test (CFT 20-R; Weiß, 2008), which built on the work of Cattell
and Cattell (1963). The CFT 20-R consisted of two halves. Each of the
two halves was further comprised of four subtests, containing diﬀerent
types of tasks (series, classiﬁcations, matrices, and typologies). For each
subtest, detailed standardized instructions were given in written form
as well as verbal and blackboard-based lessons taught by trained
administrators.
The test resulted in a total of 101 dichotomous items. To ensure a
parsimonious measurement model, we used four indicators, each of
which represented the mean score on each respective subtest (series,
classiﬁcations, matrices, and typologies). As the number of items on
each subtest varied between the test halves, we ﬁrst computed the mean
of each subtest in the ﬁrst and second test half separately. Subsequently,
we built the ﬁnal indicators for each subtest as a mean of the means of
each subtest in each test half. For instance, to compute the indicator for
the subtest “series,” we computed the mean score of the series subtest in
the ﬁrst half of the CFT and the mean score of the series subtest in the
second half. The score used in the reasoning measurement model was
the mean of these two means.
2.4. Statistical analyses
We examined the measurement models for each construct with
separate conﬁrmatory factor analyses. We used Mplus 7.11
(Muthén &Muthén, 1998–2014) for all analyses. The conﬁrmatory
factor analysis for reasoning that included continuous data was
conducted with Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation. As the items
assessing CPS and conﬁdence were dichotomous, we investigated their
factor structure using the weighted least squares means and variance
adjusted estimator (WLSMV), which is appropriate for ordinal data
(Muthén &Muthén, 2010).
Even though we did not hypothesize a particular causal relation
between conﬁdence and the CPS facets, we chose to conduct multiple
latent regression analyses in which the CPS facets were regressed on the
conﬁdence facets (and reasoning). We did this to reﬂect the paradigm of
CPS research, to obtain eﬀect sizes (i.e., R2), and to investigate the
extent to which the residuals of the CPS facets remained correlated (i.e.,
the extent to which the CPS facets remained correlated when con-
ﬁdence in CPS and reasoning were controlled for).
We took the hierarchical structure (students nested in classes) into
account by adjusting the standard errors (with the “type is complex”
option implemented in Mplus) in all analyses, and we used the CFI, TLI,
and RMSEA as indicators of the goodness of ﬁt for all factor analyses
and regressions. As we imputed ﬁve data sets, all reported ﬁt criteria
are mean values from all ﬁve imputed data sets.7
To estimate the reliability of the constructs, we used McDonald's
Omega (McDonald, 1970) for all scales with metric indicators. For the
constructs that were assessed with binary data, we used Green and
Yang's (2009) indicator, which is appropriate for categorical data.
Goldhammer, Kröhne, Keßel, Senkbeil and Ihme (2014) adapted Green
and Yang's (2009) SAS code for R. This script was also used in the
present study.
3. Results
3.1. CPS measurement models (knowledge acquisition and knowledge
application)
We used four indicators for knowledge acquisition and four
indicators for knowledge application, respectively. As we were inter-
ested in the extent to which the hypothesized predictors could explain
the variance that was shared by knowledge acquisition and knowledge
application, we did not model CPS as a hierarchical model but as two
separate constructs that are correlated.
The models for the CPS factors showed good ﬁt (knowledge
acquisition: CFI = 0.998; TLI = .993; RMSEA = .055; knowledge ap-
plication: CFI = .998; TLI = .993; RMSEA = .039) and had suﬃcient
reliability: .83 for knowledge acquisition and .70 for knowledge
application. The high model ﬁt values can be accepted with some
caution because the number of parameters in the conﬁrmatory factor
analyses was only slightly higher than the number of cells in the
covariance matrices that were the basis for the model estimation (this
holds for all factors in this paper). However, the models that we
computed to address the hypotheses also contained the measurement
models and indicated a good overall ﬁt. Thus, we could conclude that
the measurement models represented the given data well.
The mean of all manifest knowledge acquisition items was higher
(M= .46, SD= .40) than the mean of all knowledge application items
(M= .31, SD= .30), thus indicating that knowledge acquisition was
slightly easier for the students than knowledge application.
3.2. Conﬁdence in CPS measurement models (knowledge acquisition and
knowledge application)
The models for conﬁdence showed very good ﬁts for both CPS
factors (knowledge acquisition: CFI = .998; TLI = .994;
RMSEA = .038; knowledge application: CFI = .999; TLI = .999;
RMSEA = .017) and good reliability (knowledge acquisition: .79;
knowledge application: .80). The mean of the manifest conﬁdence
items showed that, overall, the students' conﬁdence was much higher
than their actual performance (mean conﬁdence for knowledge acquisi-
tion: M= .77, SD= .33; mean conﬁdence for knowledge application:
M= .81, SD= .31).
3.3. Reasoning measurement model
A latent reasoning factor model with four indicators (means of
series, classiﬁcations, matrices, and typologies for a task) showed a
satisfying model ﬁt (CFI = .995; TLI = .985; RMSEA = .063) and
reliability (ω= .85). The mean was M= .64 (SD= .13). As expected,
the reliability of the measure was higher when both test halves were
used than when only one half was used (ω1 = .77; ω2 = .75), which
conﬁrms that both test halves of the CFT should be used as an indicator
for reasoning.
3.4. Correlations between constructs
Table 1 displays the manifest correlations (between the sum scores)
and the latent correlations (between the factor scores). The manifest
correlations were computed in SPSS as correlations between the mean
values of all of the items used to measure a construct. The correlations
of the latent factors were computed in Mplus 7.11 in a model in which
all of the latent constructs were correlated (CFI = .991; TLI = .989;
RMSEA = .021). The correlations showed that the proposed latent
predictors of CPS (conﬁdence in CPS and reasoning) were signiﬁcantly
(p < .001) and strongly (ρ≥ .63; r≥ .37) correlated with both CPS
facets.
3.5. Preliminary analyses
To further verify that reasoning is a substantial predictor of CPS and
to later be able to quantify the proposed incremental variance
accounted for by conﬁdence in explaining CPS, we estimated a model
in which only reasoning predicted the CPS facets. This model ﬁt well
(CFI = .995; TLI = .994; RMSEA = .019) and explained 52% of the
variance in knowledge acquisition (p < .001) and 55% of the variance
in knowledge application (p < .001).
7 The conﬁdence intervals for the RMSEA values were not available because Browne
and Cudeck's (1993) method has not been generalized to analyses with multiple
imputations and the WLSMV estimator.
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3.5.1. Hypothesis 1 conﬁdence in CPS will be linked to CPS
To understand the link between conﬁdence in CPS and CPS
performance, we regressed the two CPS dimensions, knowledge acqui-
sition and knowledge application, on conﬁdence in CPS in knowledge
acquisition and conﬁdence in CPS in knowledge application, respec-
tively (Fig. 2). More precisely, we regressed CPS knowledge acquisition
on conﬁdence in knowledge acquisition and CPS knowledge application
on conﬁdence in knowledge application. The crosswise paths (i.e.,
regressing CPS knowledge acquisition on conﬁdence in knowledge
application and CPS knowledge application on conﬁdence in knowledge
acquisition) were ﬁxed to zero.
The model ﬁt the data well (CFI = .990; TLI = .988;
RMSEA = .027) and suggested that conﬁdence in CPS was substantially
linked to CPS, as the respective conﬁdence factor explained 67% of the
variance in knowledge acquisition (p < .001) and 55% of the variance
in knowledge application (p < .001). Further, we found that the
residuals for knowledge acquisition and knowledge application re-
mained correlated at ρ= .67 (p < .001). In spite of the excellent
model ﬁt, one might have been interested in including the crosswise
paths (i.e., regressing CPS knowledge acquisition on conﬁdence in
knowledge application and CPS knowledge application on conﬁdence in
knowledge acquisition). This, however, would have led to estimation
problems as one of the standardized regression weights was greater
than one.
3.5.2. Hypothesis 2 conﬁdence in CPS will be linked to CPS beyond
reasoning
To investigate the extent to which conﬁdence in CPS is linked to CPS
beyond reasoning, we estimated a similar structural equation model as
depicted in Fig. 3. This time we included reasoning as an additional
predictor of the CPS facets knowledge acquisition and knowledge
application (Fig. 3).
This model ﬁt the data well (CFI = .989; TLI = 0.987;
RMSEA = .023) and showed that the link between the CPS factors
and the respective conﬁdence in the CPS factors remained substantial
even when reasoning was controlled for (knowledge acquisition:
β= .61, SE= .06, p < .001; knowledge application: β= .45,
SE= .09, p < .001).
Moreover, the model showed the extent to which reasoning and
conﬁdence in the respective CPS facet together explained each CPS
facet. This result came to 76% of the variance in knowledge acquisition
(p < .001) and 69% of the variance in knowledge application
(p < .001). To obtain information on the incremental variance that
conﬁdence predicted in CPS beyond reasoning, we compared the model
as displayed in Fig. 3 with a model in which spite of the excellent model
ﬁt, one only reasoning (but not the conﬁdence factor) predicted the CPS
facet (see Preliminary Analyses). The preliminary model without
conﬁdence in CPS explained 52% of the variance in knowledge
acquisition (p < .001) and 55% of the variance in knowledge applica-
tion (p < .001). Thus, conﬁdence explained an increment of 24
percentage points of the variance in knowledge acquisition and 14
percentage points of the variance in knowledge application.
The results in Fig. 3 further show that the correlation between the
residuals of the CPS facets was reduced substantially (ρ= .34,
SE= .15, p= .022). This indicates that the variance that is shared by
the CPS facets can be explained to a great extent by reasoning and
conﬁdence in CPS.
4. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to advance our understanding of
the nature of CPS by investigating the link between metacognitive
monitoring and CPS performance. Conﬁdence in CPS as an indicator of
metacognitive monitoring was expected to be substantially linked to
CPS because successful CPS requires students to continuously monitor
their problem-solving behavior to be able to adapt it when necessary.
The decision about whether adaption is necessary relies on students'
conﬁdence. To ensure that the link between conﬁdence in CPS and CPS
is not an artefact of the known relation between these variables and
reasoning skills, we controlled for reasoning. The results indicated that
conﬁdence in CPS was still strongly linked to CPS performance even
after reasoning had been controlled for. The results will be discussed in
more detail below.
Table 1
Correlation matrix for all factors in the analyses.





CPS ACQ – .75⁎⁎⁎ .85⁎⁎⁎ .63⁎⁎⁎ .72⁎⁎⁎
CPS APP .53⁎⁎⁎ – .63⁎⁎⁎ .72⁎⁎⁎ .74⁎⁎⁎
Conﬁdence in
ACQ
.56⁎⁎⁎ .38⁎⁎⁎ – .84⁎⁎⁎ .54⁎⁎⁎
Conﬁdence in
APP
.39⁎⁎⁎ .37⁎⁎⁎ .60⁎⁎⁎ – .55⁎⁎⁎
Reasoning .56⁎⁎⁎ .51⁎⁎⁎ .41⁎⁎⁎ .42⁎⁎⁎ –
Note. Correlations between factor scores (as represented by the latent variables) above the
diagonal; correlations between mean scores of all indicators of each factor below the
diagonal; CPS = complex problem solving; ACQ = knowledge acquisition;
APP = knowledge application.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.001.
Fig. 2. CPS = complex problem solving; ACQ= knowledge acquisition; APP = knowledge application; standard errors in parentheses. ***p < .001.
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4.1. Conﬁdence in CPS is linked to CPS
The substantial link between conﬁdence in CPS and CPS indicates
that conﬁdence in CPS does have substantial value in explaining CPS,
thus validating the proposal that successful CPS requires eﬃcient self-
regulation, particularly metacognitive monitoring. The reason for this
might be that students need to realize when they have to change their
problem-solving behavior to be successful self-regulated problem
solvers (Funke, 2003; Greiﬀ& Fischer, 2013; Ifenthaler, 2012; Mayer,
1998). Conﬁdence judgments might provide an important basis for such
metacognitive activities. Moreover, our results indicate that students
are mostly aware of their performance in CPS and should, in general, be
able to utilize task-inherent cues as presented in CPS tasks
(Kröner & Biermann, 2007).
Our results show that conﬁdence and performance scores are more
closely related during knowledge acquisition than during knowledge
application. This may be explained by the task characteristics: In the
knowledge acquisition phase, there was plenty of time to adapt one's
problem solving behavior, whereas the time and number of clicks were
limited in the knowledge application phase such that self-regulation
might have a more limited eﬀect in the knowledge application phase.
4.2. Conﬁdence in CPS is linked to CPS beyond reasoning
As mentioned above, the link between conﬁdence in CPS and CPS
performance remained stable when we controlled for reasoning,
suggesting that self-monitoring is an essential component of CPS.
Future studies may wish to use this as a starting point to investigate
discriminant as well as diﬀerential predictive validity of performance
judgments on various tests. For this goal, conﬁdence should be included
not only in CPS but also in other performance measures applied in
future studies. This accounts in particular for conﬁdence in reasoning,
as reasoning and CPS are closely related (Stadler et al., 2015).
The results further show that conﬁdence in CPS and reasoning
explain a substantial amount of the CPS-speciﬁc variance that is shared
by the two CPS facets knowledge acquisition and knowledge applica-
tion. This indicates that self-monitoring and reasoning are core
components that are necessary for making a person a good complex
problem solver. An interesting open question that remains is whether
other, more distal constructs than those investigated here may demon-
strate an interplay with performance judgments to explain performance
in CPS (e.g., mastery orientation; Scherer, Greiﬀ, & Hautamäki, 2015).
4.2.1. Limitations
When interpreting the presented results, some limitations need to be
taken into account. For instance, this study did not allow any causal
inferences to be made due to its cross-sectional nature. In addition, the
study was based on the voluntary participation of the schools and
students, who also needed the consent of their parents. Thus, the
representativeness of our sample for the population of German students
cannot be taken for granted.
Another limitation involves the extent to which conﬁdence was
assessed: Conﬁdence consists of two aspects: the judgment (i.e.,
whether the students think they solved a task correctly or not) and
the extent to which they are certain about their performance judgment.
As mentioned in the beginning, the wording of the conﬁdence assess-
ment in our study confounds the two aspects, as in most existing
studies. We focused on the performance judgment as a central aspect of
CPS. Future studies may wish to build on the present ﬁndings and
investigate the relevance of the certainty of the performance judgment
while disentangling performance and certainty judgments in the
wording of the question (Händel & Fritzsche, 2016). However, we
expect both aspects to be valid indicators of self-monitoring in CPS
tasks, as problem solvers are in constant need of evaluating their
performance during problem solving to decide whether they should
continue following the path and strategy they chose or whether they
should change their problem solving approach (Funke, 2003; Mayer,
1998).
4.2.2. Outlook
The present study contributes to a better understanding of CPS as it
suggests that self-regulation, particularly metacognitive monitoring as
reﬂected by conﬁdence in CPS, is closely linked to CPS. This ﬁnding is
in line with previous ﬁndings that have shown that CPS is linked to
other aspects of metacognition. In particular, Wüstenberg et al. (2014)
postulated that metastrategic knowledge (i.e., knowledge about know-
ing a strategy) is relevant for successful CPS. Future research may wish
to build on this foundation and investigate additional aspects of
metacognition and their role in CPS. It might be especially interesting
to investigate the adaption of the CPS process after a negative
conﬁdence judgment, as we believe that this is at the core of CPS:
Students do not proﬁt from simply knowing that their problem solving
is improvable, but they need to know how to improve it, too.
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